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ABSTRACT
The use of Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I), Vehicle to
Roadside Unit (V2R) and Vehicle to Other (V2X) communications are increasingly
applied over existing and upcoming transportation means by the United States
Department of Transportation (USDOT) and other federal agencies. From previous
statistical data, these technologies would primarily avoid or mitigate vehicle crashes and
would provide more safety, mobility and various other benefits on the roads (“Traffic
Safety Facts 2012,” 2013; “Traffic Safety Facts 2013” 2014). During the communication
processes between vehicles, infrastructures and roadside units’ various sensitive data
such as positions and speed of the vehicles, are transmitted which are currently highly
vulnerable. These facts are generated from this research experiment results performed on
the provided data sets from the University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute
(UMTRI). An interference to the vehicular communications is possible by intentional or
unintentional malicious users or other elements which puts drivers at greater risk with the
upcoming vehicular technology. Moreover, different agencies and private companies are

utilizing collected data from the USDOT to improve the operational volume of roads and
services while avoiding accidents. They are also trying to provide other third-party
Internet-based services to the consumers based on the live streaming information.
This research paper gives a detailed description of all aspects of the vehicular
communications protocol (i.e. DSRC, CA, 802.11p protocol, smart infrastructure, etc.).
This research paper will provide details of all identified security features (i.e. encryption
methods, certificate management, physical securities, data management lifecycles, etc.)
that have been applied to these mechanisms to protect the safety of drivers (Cronin,
2013). The USDOT has currently approved the implementation of a 5.9 GHz band, along
with the 802.11p standard wireless protocol for dedicated short-range communications
used in vehicular communication (Shankland, 2014). This research paper will also
provide details of current standards and regulations which will be in effect for the
upcoming vehicular technologies in the future in the US along with the susceptibilities to
the interruptions of services.
Finally, this research will utilize the actual data sets compiled using the actual
safety pilot model deployment (SPMD) provided by the UMRTI researchers. The
analysis of these results will validate that this protocol is susceptible to interference
during communications. This will be shown by plotting the latitudinal and longitudinal
coordinates and thus demonstrating the occurrence of gaps within communication (i.e.
interference to the vehicular communication) in the existing SPMD prototype data sets.
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CHAPTER 1
1.1

INTRODUCTION

Vehicular Technology
Vehicular technology refers to wireless communications systems between two
or more vehicles or vehicles to roadside infrastructures and others those are
available in the streets regardless of their state of motion. In general, vehicles
equipped with vehicle technology consists of equipment’s such as Vehicle OnBoard Unit (OBU) used in the vehicle, Road Side Unit (RSU) used over in the
infrastructures at intersections, gas stations and safe communication channel used
between transmission of data to the minimal level.
Vehicular network utilizes the dedicated short-range communications (DSRC)
devices, vehicular networks, certificate authority for handling quick secure
transition between vehicles and infrastructure. The vehicular communications also
include fast handling algorithms that use live-streaming data exchanged between
vehicles and infrastructure elements to perform calculations. The transmitter
presented in the OBU and RSU equipment would use the dedicated portion of
wireless spectrum, new wireless standard 802.11p to authenticate each message
(Faezipour, Mehrdad, Adnan, and Addepalli, 2012, pg. 90-100; Weimerskirch,
n.d.)
During the vehicular communication, different critical information of vehicles
such as speed, acceleration and distance along with general information such as
weather and traffic are being transmitted which assist the drivers in a timely
manner (“2015 FHWA Vehicle to Infrastructure”2014). Based upon the

2

information gathered, sorted from different vehicles during the process, it
recognizes high-risk situations ahead of time and produces driver alerts and
warnings. This is also known as signal phase and timing (SPAT) information,
which is one of the most important advantages of using vehicular technologies
(Peter, Zsolt, Szilard, 2014, #ch-9).
The effectiveness of such vehicular technologies is due to the reliability of
wireless communication and transmission of vehicle data. The live data feeds
from the vehicular communications at all times will initially assist drivers with the
help of active safety features and can even engage in applying brakes or steering
to avoid collision without the driver’s involvement in some cases.

Figure1.1: An example demonstrating overall vehicular communication technology [20]

The above figure shows a general architecture of how vehicular technology
functions in a real world which has been presented by the wired insights for
connected vehicles. It illustrates how connected vehicles would be able to
communicate with each other and with smart infrastructures. This would
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symbolize how the future road structure will look like with the presence of smart
units in each vehicle which are capable of communicating with other vehicles and
all smart technologies while secure vehicular communications take place. The
following section further discusses in detail how each inter and intra vehicular
communication takes place and all its necessary components which are listed as
follow:

1.2

Vehicle to Vehicle communications (V2V)
Vehicle to Vehicle communications (V2V) refers to wireless communications
between two or more vehicles, regardless of the state of motion. The upcoming
vehicles would have smart on board units’ presence in each vehicle which are
capable of communicating and sharing information with another vehicle. This
exchange of information among vehicles are intended to improve better safety and
decrease motor vehicle collisions (Peter, Zsolt, Szilard, 2014, #ch-9).

1.3

Vehicle to Infrastructure communications (V2I)
Vehicle to

Infrastructure communications

(V2I) refers to

wireless

communications between vehicles and the smart infrastructure, regardless of the
state of motion. The smart infrastructure would include traffic light, and other
infrastructures which are governmentally owned and operated. Also V2I requires
cryptography operations to calculate over 200 digital signatures generated, and
transmit over 1000 messages per second between the infrastructure and vehicle to
efficiently perform its duty (Faezipour, Mehrdad, Adnan, and Addepalli, 2012,
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pg. 90-100). It is estimated that V2I communications will help reduce additional
12 percent of crashes which had not been addressed by V2V communications
(Weimerskirch, n.d.).

1.4

Vehicle to Roadside Unit(V2R)
Vehicle to roadside unit communications (V2R) refers to wireless
communications between vehicles and the roadside unit such as businesses via
internet access. V2r would be differ from the V2I communications as the
mechanism implemented could be privately owned and operated by local business
and services. It is estimated that with the help of smart road side unit technology,
this would not only reduce the number of road accidents, but also will help reduce
travel speed while decreasing fuel consumption, making transportation more
efficient. The RSU would act as a gateway to have all live traffic information
provided to vehicle during the vehicular communication process. RSU would
have paid services containing live feeds of info such as weather forecast,
emergency vehicles notifications, parking information, and other businesses
related to help people find nearest distance to stop the vehicle (Faezipour,
Mehrdad, Adnan, and Addepalli, 2012, pg. 90-100).

1.5

Vehicle to Others (V2X) [pedestrian, bicycle, etc.]
Vehicle to Vehicle communications (V2X) refers to wireless communications
between vehicles and pedestrian or bicycle, regardless of the state of motion. The
live data feeds used during vehicle to other (V2X) communications at all times
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will initially assist drivers with the help of active safety features and can even
engage in applying brakes or steering to avoid collision without the driver’s
involvement in some cases.

1.6

Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC)
The DSRC is also considered as the heartbeat of this technology as it includes
information such as geographic location, timestamp and speed which is being
broadcasted at all-time (Peter, Zsolt, Szilard, 2014, #ch-9). Vehicular network
utilizes the dedicated short-range communications (DSRC) devices which work in
5.9 GHz band with bandwidth of 75MHz spectrum and approximate range of
1000 meters (Harding, Powell, Yoon, Fikentscher, Doyle, Sade, Lukuc, Simons
and Wang, 2014).

1.7

Certificate Authority (CA)
The vehicular technologies consist of Certificate Authority (CA) which
generates cryptographic key which help vehicles to communicate over TLS to the
RSU as it would mostly be connected at all-time (Peter, Zsolt, Szilard, 2014, #ch9; Weimerskirch, n.d.; “2015 FHWA Vehicle to Infrastructure”2014)

1.8

Vehicular Networks
The vehicular technology uses a variation of the 802.11p wireless network
standards which are used in the laptops and mobile devices which would create
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communications and share speed and position information among other vehicles
in 10 times per second.

Summary
The research performed and data collected will define how USDOT, NHTSA,
FHWA has been more focus on the safety based upon the number of fatalities and
vehicle accidents each year rather than assuring security and privacy to US
citizens. During vehicular communications processes between vehicles,
infrastructures, road side units and others various sensitive data such as driver’s
identification, positions and speed of the vehicles, are transmitted which makes
people concern about their privacy along with safety issues. Moreover, different
agencies and manufacturing companies are utilizing data collected by the
department of transportation to improve the structural capacity of roads, services
while avoiding accidents. They are trying to provide other third party internet
based services to the consumers based on the live streaming information. This
exchanges are intended to improve better safety and decrease motor vehicle
collisions according to the USDOT (Peter, Zsolt, Szilard, 2014, #ch-9). This paper
will provide overview of the current state of overall vehicular technology; its open
issues and the necessary implementations for future as recommended for the US
based implementation.

7

Research Question
This research performed will provide detail analysis and study of results of issues
listed below:
1. Can we determine that the SPMD (Safety Pilot Deployment Model) protocol is
susceptible to the

interruption during V2I (vehicle to infrastructure)

communication and thus verify our proposed objectives using the SPMD data
sets?
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CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Research primarily based on the past studies for vehicular communication
technologies have focused more on the safety of human lives than the privacy and
security of an individual her in the United States. There have been numerous cyberattacks and security breaches on businesses, financial institutions, and government’s IT
systems almost every day with the increase in the advancement of information
technology. The danger of cyber threats in vehicular communication technologies will as
well certainly rise when vehicles are online at all time, to be connected with each other or
to smart infrastructures. This project illustrates the necessity for providing better safety to
drivers in the United States with the upcoming vehicular communications technologies. A
brief description and previous research studies concerning different aspects of vehicular
communication technologies are discussed as below:

2.1

Vehicular communication prototypes
There exist large volumes of research over the vehicle to vehicle (V2V),
vehicle to infrastructure (V2I), vehicle to roadside unit (V2R), vehicle to others
(V2X) such as pedestrians or bicycles, and other vehicular networking
technologies. An increasing amount of innovative studies are being carried out
about using upcoming smarter sensor and communication mediums over
vehicular technologies in order to make the roads safer, cleaner with (Festag,
Alban, Roberto, Long Le and Dirk, n.d.). According to “In Vehicle Network:
Attacks, Vulnerabilities and Proposed Solutions” research paper, the recent
approaches applied in the implementation of future vehicular communications by
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the U.S Government implies approaching vehicle which require transmitting
information are at risk and are susceptible to attacks (Carsten, Todd, Mark and
Jeffrey, 2015).

2.2

Smart Infrastructure architecture
The process of wireless exchange of critical safety data and active data
between vehicles and the road’s smart infrastructures are known as Vehicle to
Infrastructure communications. This exchange is intended to improve better safety
and decrease motor vehicle collisions (Faezipour, Mehrdad, Adnan, and
Addepalli, 2012, pg. 90-100). Many studies have proven that implementation of
intra vehicular communications are improving. The smart architecture would be
design to handle, process and store large amounts of data containing personal
identifiable information of individuals which is major challenge towards
implementing mandatory regulation by the US federal government in the
upcoming

vehicular

communications

(“2015

FHWA

Vehicle

to

Infrastructure”2014).
The 2015 FHWA Vehicle to Infrastructure deployment guidance and
products document mentions “FHWA will develop materials needed to support
deployment (e.g. guide tools and best practices); ensure that deployed services are
geographically interoperable and ensure that deployed services are developed in
accordance with the requirements in Part 940 of Title 23 within the Code of
Federal Regulations (23 CFR 940) and other applicable regulations” (“2015
FHWA Vehicle to Infrastructure”2014). With the continuous progression of
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capability and complexity of vehicular technologies, security issues arise to both
intra-vehicle and inter-vehicle systems evolving in our daily lives (Zheng,
Wenchao Li, Gerard, Zhu, and Shankar, 2015). The research paper “Future Cars:
Necessity for an Adaptive and Distributed Multiple Independent Levels of
Security Architecture” describes how security must be treated holistically and the
design be suitable for adaptability and must also provide multiple independent
levels of security for each architecture (Camek, Christian, Alois, 2013, pg. 17-24).
This research argues the upcoming vehicular communication technologies
proposed in the United States would have security challenges, privacy concerns
along with safety issue for protecting more human lives (Camek, Christian, Alois,
2013, pg. 17-24; Zeman, 2015; “2015 FHWA Vehicle,” 2014). Some studies have
delineated the following aspects:

2.3

Security challenges in overall design
With the evolving smart infrastructure in place by the US government for
gathering experimental data and also while trying to mandate it as regulation,
upcoming vehicular technologies rises a lot of security challenges as debated by
numerous scholar’s research papers. It has been shown from research records that
most manufacturing industries producing vehicles with vehicular products lack
appropriate security measures to protect against sophisticated hackers (Zeman,
2015). “The Security Certificate Management System (SCMS) is a critical
component of the CV environment designed to protect the security of the BSM
data exchanged by vehicles and between vehicles and infrastructure” (“2015
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FHWA Vehicle to Infrastructure”2014). Multiple research papers and
experiments have proven the lack of adequate security measures by the US
Government to the upcoming vehicular technology which will threaten the
confidentiality and safety of all citizens, while trying to mandate these measures
as law to provide safety. As discussed by few research papers, the advancement
in the security policy by the USDOT & FWHA must ensure the minimum
requirements and limitations on the use of DSRC broadcasted information by
police or DMV, and must clearly outline the revocation and re-installation
procedure of DSRC unit to identify any made-up revocation for wrong operation
(Weimerskirch, n.d.). One of the recommendations delivered by a research study
for reliability of expected packets sent through the smart infrastructure was to
implement the level of trustworthiness for DSRC unit that could display the
applied level of physical security (Weimerskirch, n.d.).

2.4

Automobile safety issue
According to the research performed in the town of Ann Arbor, Michigan, by
the University of Michigan and NHTSA, it was found that the vehicular
technology could prevent more than half a million accidents and more than a
thousand fatalities in the United States every year (Shankland, 2014). These
experiments were performed using over 3000 cars equipped with vehicular
communications devices to evaluate the overall significance of the vehicular
networking technology (Shankland, 2014). Also it has been reported by the
NHTSA that the number of people who died in roadway crashes decreased from
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33,561 on 2012 to 32,719 on 2013; a 3.1 percent decrease in roadway crash
fatalities (“Traffic Safety Facts 2012”, 2013; “Traffic Safety Facts 2013”, 2014).
The NHTSA also reported the number of people injured in 2013 due to vehicular
collisions was 2.31 million, 2.1 percent less than in 2012 (Markey, Blumenthal,
2015). On average, the U.S highways experience approximately 43,0000 fatalities
per year more than 14,000 crashes per day (Faezipour, Mehrdad, Adnan, and
Addepalli, 2012, pg. 90-100). This information demonstrate how the US based
research are focused more towards safety rather than providing more privacy and
security to an individuals and several research papers have agreed upon these
testimonials (Graig, 2014; Heijden, 2010; “Traffic Safety Facts 2012”, 2013;
Weimerskirch, n.d.).

2.5

Data management life cycle
Research primarily based on a draft of deployment guidance and products
have revealed that the FHWA, NHTSA and USDOT do not have any applicable
policies or procedures for the overall data management processes (“2015 FHWA
Vehicle to Infrastructure”2014). “In general, Federal law does not assign
ownership, access, and use limitation to broadcast data. As a result, the US.DOT
and FHWA do not currently have a specific policy assigning data ownership or
limiting access to BSM data” (“2015 FHWA Vehicle to Infrastructure”2014). The
U.S. department of transportation and the Federal Highway Administration must
ensure strong security and enforce well-structured policies for each step during
the entire data management life cycle.
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2.6

U.S. Federal Government proposed guidance and recently
proposed bill
“Connected Vehicle Environments (CVE) are systems comprised of
hardware, software, and firmware that allow for the dynamic transfer of data
between vehicles and between vehicles and the infrastructure including, at a
minimum, Wireless Access in Vehicular Environment (WAVE) messages defined
in Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) J2735 that are broadcast on Dedicated
Short

Range

Communications

(DSRC)”

(“2015

FHWA

Vehicle

to

Infrastructure”2014). The USDOT has currently approved to implement a 5.9
GHz band, along with a 802.11p standard for vehicular technologies dedicated
short range communications (Shankland, 2014). The USDOT currently has a
well-defined and stable design to deploy the vehicular technology application but
must try to resolve most of the open concerns such as geo-networking,
misbehavior detection, physical security and security controllers, bootstrapping
and security policies that has been discovered by some of the research studies
(Weimerskirch, n.d.).
Multiple scholars of evolving vehicular technologies have stated that the
implementation of US Government policies and technical implementation would
jeopardize the security and privacy of any individuals using such technology.
Thus a current bill has been purposed by Senators Markey and Blumenthal cited
as the “Security and Privacy in your Car Act of 2015” or the “SPY Car Act of
2015” in order to protect U.S. citizens from security and privacy threats to their
motor vehicles and for other purposes (Markey, Blumenthal, 2015). A copy of
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SPY Car 2015 Act has been reference to Appendix D of this document. This
would reveal how the US government has started a process to re-identify critical
and key issues to provide better safety to all citizens while providing safety by
having reduced accidents with the vehicular technology.
Research studies have led the United States government to implement such
techniques into transportation development projects for better safety of its citizen
while on roads. The US Federal Highway Administration has proposed a mandate
to take effect by 2020 in order to prevent human life loss in road accidents (Graig,
2014). This would allow USDOT and other transportation agencies to accomplish
additional research, which would tighten up the security features of applications
and also have strong standards implemented by then. The US based project
focuses on V2V safety, communication security, and single hop V2I
communication to load security credentials (Weimerskirch, n.d.).

Summary
There have been several studies completed that support the safety of drivers
but few have only concentrated on the security of the vehicular communication
devices which will be used by drivers. Different groups of vehicles are developed
for different developmental regions based upon geographical locations and will
have differences with the mechanism, spectrum and software collaboration. These
protocols have proven to be much more efficient, reliable and convenient while
providing safer environments for all drivers while on the road. But it is crucial for
all nations to have comparably standard implementations and procedure to
provide additional safety, and security of drivers with the upcoming vehicular
technologies.
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These studies validate how providing more safety of drivers within the US by
various unauthorized users, substances and agent are becoming major challenges
towards upgrading to support the vehicular technologies.
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CHAPTER 3

ARCHITECTURE OF VEHICULAR

TECHNOLOGIES
3.1

Vehicular technology overall structure
The vehicle communication systems are made up of hardware,
software, wireless protocols, and firmware which allows means of transportation
to get interconnected to be able to transfer data with other vehicles and
infrastructure. According to the IEEE Vehicular Technology Magazine, guest
editors have described the upcoming automobile as “Vehicle are no longer a piece
of the mechanical machine but a system of computerized and highly sophisticated
electronic devices with hundreds of sensors embedded with and all over them”
(Zhuang, Jamalipour, Bai, Vinel, 2015). Below figure 3.1 show the overall
structure and vision of vehicular technologies by different nations including the

United States, the European nations, and others.
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Figure 3.1: Overall structure of Vehicular technologies
In

general, vehicular communication technologies consist of

equipment’s and components such as vehicle On-Board Unit (OBU), Basic Safety
Message (BSM), Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) protocol,
Wireless Access in Vehicular Environment (WAVE) protocol, Road Side Unit
(RSU) protocol, Certificate Authority (CA) and Security Certificate Management
System (SCMS) mechanisms.

Figure 3.2: Structural design in a vehicle equipped with vehicular technology
(“2015 FHWA Vehicle to Infrastructure”2014)

These protocols are being utilized for secure channel communication
purposes between vehicles, infrastructures, and others to improve road traffic
safety through various smart interactive mediums. The figure 3.2 shown below
shows how the On board unit prototype looks and functions in a vehicle. The
OBU will be able to deliver various useful information to the vehicle not only to
avoid any sort of collisions but also improve the road efficiency and safety by
integrating wireless communications and informatics technology.
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Figure 3.3: On Board Unit prototype (“What’s Next V2V”, 2014)
Above figure 3.3 shows a general structure of how the on board units’
functions in a real world. Figure3 demonstrates a complete view of overall on
board unit in a vehicle providing live feed information regarding safety to the
driver of the vehicle. The live data feeds from vehicular communications at all
times will assist drivers with active safety features and can even engage in
applying brakes or steering to avoid the collision without the driver’s involvement
in some cases.
The other different components which are essentials for vehicular
communications technologies are discussed as follow:

3.1.1 Wireless Network Prototype
The vehicular technology uses a variation of the 802.11 wireless
network standards as the core communications standard which are
consumed in the laptops and mobile device to establish efficient
communication regarding speed and position information among other
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vehicles in 10 times per second. Vehicular network consumes the
dedicated short-range communications devices which work in

5.9GHz

band with bandwidth of 75MHz spectrum and approximate range of 1000
meters (Harding, Powell, Yoon, Fikentscher, Doyle, Sade, Lukuc, Simons
and Wang, 2014). The DSRC is also considered as the heartbeat of this
technology as it includes information such as geographic location,
timestamp, and speed which is broadcasted at all-time (Weimerskirch,
n.d.). The transmitter presented in the OBU and RSU equipment would
use the dedicated portion of the wireless spectrum, new wireless standard
802.11p to authenticate each message (Weimerskirch, n.d.; “2015 FHWA
Vehicle to Infrastructure”2014)

3.1.2 Cryptography Algorithm
Vehicular technologies utilize an incorporated cryptography
algorithm to communicate efficiently and securely among vehicles and
smart infrastructures. All calculations that could identify a collision or risk
situation on the road would be transmitted in seconds to all vehicles in
advance thus providing maximum safety of an individuals. Thus, the best
advantages of such communications are the signal phase and timing
(SPAT) information which transmits safety advisories and a warning to
drivers among vehicle via other vehicles or infrastructure (Peter, Zsolt,
Szilard, 2014, #ch-9). The vehicular technologies also consist of
Certificate Authority (CA) which generates the cryptographic key and
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communicates over TLS to the RSU as it would always be connected at
all-time (Peter, Zsolt, Szilard, 2014, #ch-9; Weimerskirch, n.d.; “2015
FHWA Vehicle to Infrastructure”2014). The most important role of TLS
protocol would be to ensure that no eavesdrop or tampering of devices
takes place during any communication processes between two vehicles or
vehicles to infrastructure thus providing complete assurance of security in
vehicular technologies. The RSU would act as a gateway having all live
traffic

information

provided

to

vehicle

during

the

vehicular

communication process. RSU would also have paid services containing
live feeds of info such as weather forecast, emergency vehicles
notifications, parking information, and other businesses related to helping
people find the nearest distance to stop the vehicle (Weimerskirch, n.d.).

3.1.3 SCMS Manager
It stands for Security Credential Management Systems, and its
purpose is to provide secure system design to the vehicular
communication technologies by verifying authentic messages that are
being transmitted between vehicles or the smart infrastructures. “The
SCMS encompasses all technical, organizational, and operational aspects
of the V2V security system that is needed to support trusted, safe/secure
V2V communications and to protect driver privacy appropriately. The
primary managerial component of the envisioned SCMS (called the SCMS
Manager) would be responsible for managing all other component entities
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(called Certificate Management Entities or CMEs) which support the
different V2V security functions that, together ensure the operational
integrity of the total system.” (“Vehicle-to-Vehicle Security”, 2014) It
would also mitigate attacks or identify misbehavior during the vehicle
communication to protect against attacks so as to ensure the privacy of all
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l

Figure 3.4: Overview of SCMS structure (“V2V Communication
Security”, 2014)
The figure 3.4 shown above shows how SCMS Manager works and
functions in the overall structure to ensure better safety and privacy of
drivers during vehicular communications. The figure demonstrates a
complete view of overall technical and operational aspects of SCMS
Manager.
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The following sections further discussed in detail about how vehicle-tovehicle (V2V), vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I), vehicle-to-roadside unit
(V2R), and vehicle-to-other (V2X) structure regarding functionality,
components required and how each structure differentiate among one
another:

3.2

Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V)

Figure 3.5: Vehicle to Vehicle communication structure (ZTE Corporation, n.d.)
Above figure 3.5 shows a general structure of how Vehicle to Vehicle
functions in a real world. The figure demonstrates how one vehicle communicates
to other vehicles and also to the smart Infrastructures thus sharing various types of
information and data essentials to aware all roads conditions among each other.
From the figure shown above, we can also agree that Vehicular communication
technologies are similar to that of mobile cellular networks but are specifically
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developed for vehicle mobility to have better efficiency and safety of all
individuals on the road.

3.3

Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I)

Figure 3.6: An example demonstrating Structural design of V2I systems (Camek,
Christian, Alois, 2013, pg. 17-24)

Above figure 3.6 shows a general architecture of how V2I systems functions
which was presented by the ITS Joint Program Office, USDOT (Camek,
Christian, Alois, 2013, pg. 17-24). The figure demonstrates how antenna located
on OBU connects using DSRC to the antenna of RSU during V2Icommunications
process. It too illustrates how the RSU processor connects to the router of the
infrastructure would then have the IPv6 network connection, have Certificate
Authority over the Centers to distribute the gathered information. It has been
similarly cited in research papers that RSU would help prioritize messages to be
shown based on the criticality of the messages (Peter, Zsolt, Szilard, 2014, #ch-9;
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Harding, Powell, Yoon, Fikentscher, Doyle, Sade, Lukuc, Simons and Wang,
2014; Markey, Blumenthal, 2015). RSU would act as a gateway having all live
traffic information provided to the vehicle during the V2I communication process.
RSU would also have paid services containing live feeds of info such as weather
forecast, emergency vehicles notifications, parking information, and other
businesses related to helping people find the nearest distance to stop the vehicle
(Weimerskirch, n.d.).

3.4

Vehicle to Others (V2X)

Figure 3.7: Vehicle to other communication structure [23]
Above figure 3.7 shows a general structure of how Vehicle to Others
functions in a real world. The figure demonstrates a complete view of overall
vehicular

communications

among

multiple

vehicle,

infrastructure,

and

pedestrians. The figure shows how pedestrians would be obstacles for vehicle,
and the vehicle could avoid the collision by getting the notification ahead of time.
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CHAPTER 4

EFFECTS OF VEHICULAR

TECHNOLOGIES
On average, the U.S highways experience more than five million vehicle crashes
every year which includes approximately more than 30, 000 fatalities (“2015 FHWA
Vehicle to Infrastructure”2014). The report presented by the NHTSA has found that
32,675 people killed in roadway crashes during 2014 which is 25 percent less than the
year 2005 in which 43,443 people were dead (“Traffic Safety Facts 2012”, 2013; “Traffic
Safety Facts 2013”, 2014). The NHTSA has also reported the number of people that were
injured in 2014 to be 2.3 million which is 13 percent less than in 2005, which shows 2.69
million of people injured due to vehicle collisions (“Traffic Safety Facts 2013”, 2014).
The data gathered by the NHTSA from 2005 to 2014 in the crash records finding are
shown in the table below:
TABLE 4.1: Crash Reports findings presented by NHTSA from 2005 to 2014
(“Traffic Safety Facts 2012”, 2013; “Traffic Safety Facts 2013”, 2014)
Year

Number of Fatalities

Fatalities Rate

Number of injured people
(million)

2014
2013

32,675
32,719

3.2
3.2

2.3
2.31

2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005

33,782
32,367

3.3
3.2

32,885
33,808

3.2
3.3

37,423

3.7

41,059
42,642
43,443

4.1
4.2
4.3

2.36
2.21
2.23
2.22
2.34
2.49
2.57
2.69
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Figure 4.1: Fatalities and Fatality Rate per 100 million Vehicle Miles Traveled
by Year
Figure 4.1 shows a graph of the number of people who died in motor vehicle
traffic crashes in the United States from 2005 to 2014. It has been projected that with the
help of vehicular technologies, this would not only reduce the number of road accidents
but also will assist in reducing travel speed while decreasing fuel consumption, and
making transportation more efficient. The US Federal Highway Administration has
proposed a mandate to take effect in the mid-2020s to prevent human life loss in road
accidents (Graig, 2014). The upcoming new era connected vehicular technologies would
consist of safety feature, and also the security concerns. The connected vehicles would be
an improvement toward increased safety of human lives but would also concerns the
security of all drivers.
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The following sections further discusses in detail how both positive and negative
aspects perform a significant role to the upcoming vehicular technologies which are listed
as follow:

4.1

Improvement to the automobile safety
An experiment was performed between 2012 and 2014 by researchers at the
University of Michigan in collaboration with the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA). During the experiment nearly 3000 cars were equipped
with

experimental

vehicular

communication

technologies

to

study

the

communications records of those vehicles. Based on the reduced number of accidents
and fatalities, reported by the University of Michigan, NHTSA concluded that the
new vehicular technology could prevent more than half of the total accidents that
occurs every year within US (Weimerskirch, n.d.). Also, NHTSA concluded that the
upcoming vehicular technology would revolutionize the entire transportation industry
by preventing thousands of fatalities thus would want to ultimately mandate the use
of vehicular technology for safety purposes in the future (Harding, Powell, Yoon,
Fikentscher, Doyle, Sade, Lukuc, Simons and Wang, 2014; “Traffic Safety Facts
2012”, 2013; “Traffic Safety Facts 2013”, 2014; Weimerskirch, n.d). The experiment
performed also evaluates the overall significance of the

upcoming vehicular

networking technology.
The 2015 FHWA Vehicle to Infrastructure deployment guidance and products
document does mention clearly in its report that “FHWA will develop materials
needed to support deployment (e.g. guide tools and best practices); ensure that
deployed services are geographically interoperable and ensure that deployed services
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are developed in accordance with the requirements in Part 940 of Title 23 of the Code
of Federal Regulations (23 CFR 940) and other applicable regulations.” (Zeman,
2015). It is similarly stated in most of the research paper that vehicular technologies
will be able to take benefit of existing and evolving vehicular technologies services
which are additional features or an upgrade to current vehicular technologies (“2015
FHWA Vehicle to Infrastructure”2014).

4.2

Securities threats
The protocols that have are voted for the current intra-vehicular technologies
will not provide adequate security to protect against intentional and unintentional
threats. There have been numerous cyber-attacks and security breaches on businesses,
financial institutions, and government’s IT systems almost every day with the
increase in the advancement of information technology. The danger of cyber threats
in vehicular communications technologies will as well, without doubt, rise when
vehicles are online at all time to connect with each other’s or the smart
infrastructures.
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CHAPTER 5

DETERMINING THE INTERRUPTION OF

SERVICES
In this chapter, we will explore weaknesses of upcoming vehicular technologies
protocol based upon the Safety Pilot Model Deployment (SPMD) Research/experiment
data. The research data was obtained from https://www.its-rde.net/home website as
suggested by Walton Fehr, the Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology | ITS
Joint Program Office in the US Department of Transportation (USDOT).

5.1

Experimental Setup
5.1.1 Safety Pilot Model Data (SPMD) data set
The SPMD is a complete data collection effort by the researchers
at the University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute (UTMRI)
involved with other different research entities to test the vehicular
communication devices under the real world condition (United State
Department of Transportation, 2012; Basic Safety Message, 2016). Based
on the facts provided in the UMTRI website, the federal agencies
supporting the project are the USDOT, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration

(NHTSA),

Research

and

Innovative

Technology

Administration (RITA), Federal Highway Administration (FHWA),
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) and Federal
Transit Administration(FTA) (United State Department of Transportation,
2012; Basic Safety Message, 2016). During this experiment nearly 3000
vehicles which includes cars, truck and transit buses were equipped with
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experimental vehicular communication technologies to analyze the
communications records between vehicles (United State Department of
Transportation, 2012; Basic Safety Message, 2016). The entire purpose of
this experiment was to demonstrate how vehicular technologies would
operate in a real environment by evaluating the interoperability of
Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) and also the possibility,
scalability and security of the protocol devices.

5.1.2 Actual SPMD experimental setup and device utilized
There were three safety pilot devices installed in multiple vehicles to
perform vehicular communication during the actual experiment at Ann Arbor
[27]. The list is as follow:
a. Vehicle Awareness Device(VAD)
b. Aftermarket Safety Device(ASD)
c. ASD+ Data Acquisition System (DAS)
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F
igu
re 5.1.2: Images and description of actual Safety Pilot Devices (United State Department
of Transportation, 2012).
Above figure 5.1.2 shows the actual devices image with detail
description provided by the UMTRI safety pilot website.
There were also approximately 27-30 Roadside Equipment (RSE)
units that were installed around University area in Ann Arbor for the
research purposes. The actual document provides information on how the
devices installed includes twenty-one signalized intersections, three curve
locations, and five freeway locations.
TABLE 5.1.2: Detail Description of all RSE units used during actual experiment
[27] [28]
RxDevice
18001
18002

SpId
127
126

Manufacturer
Location
Savari
Fuller-Glen
Savari
Fuller-Maiden

Latitude
42.28537
42.28647

Longitude
-83.7354
-83.73249

RseCategory RSEID
Signal
127
Signal
0126-A

32

18003

170

Savari

18004

171

Savari

18005
18006

194
173

Savari
Savari

18007
18008
18009

175
94
153

Savari
Savari
Arada

18010

76

Savari

18011

192

Savari

18012

159

Savari

18013

157

Savari

18014

81

Savari

18015

86

Savari

18016

137

Savari

18017

15

Savari

18018

16

Savari

18019

38

Savari

18020

191

Savari

18021

190

Savari

18022

100

Savari

18024

193

Savari

18025

172

Savari

18026
18027

862
1712

Savari
Savari

Lane
Fuller-Cedar
Bend
FullerBonisteel Blvd
Fuller-Glazier
Way
Fuller Court
Fuller-Huron
High Drive
Fuller-Geddes
Main-Depot
PlymouthBarton
PlymouthMurfin Ave
PlymouthTraverwood
Dr.
PlymouthNixon Rd
PlymouthHuron Pkwy
PlymouthGreen
WashtenawHuron Pkwy
WashtenawPittsfield Blvd
WashtenawYost Blvd
WashtenawUS23 Ramp
PlymouthPointe West
PlymouthPointe East
PlymouthMurfin Ave
Fuller-Glazier
Way West
Fuller-Glazier
Way East
PlymouthGreen
Fuller-

42.28714

-83.72381

Signal

170

42.29032

-83.71918

Signal/Csw

42.28595
42.28363

-83.711
-83.7111

Signal
Signal

194
173

42.2808
42.2776
42.28914

-83.70635
-83.699
-83.7473

Signal
Signal
Signal

175
94
153

42.29635

-83.7307

Signal

76

42.29155

-83.71911

Signal

192

42.30206

-83.71213

Signal

159

42.30247

-83.70724

Signal

157

42.30258

-83.7043

Signal

81

42.30489

-83.6926

Signal

0086-A

42.25653

-83.6954

Signal

137

42.25589

-83.69065

Signal

15

42.25517

-83.68771

Signal

16

42.2552

-83.68635

Signal

38

42.29823

-83.72196

Csw

191

42.29905

-83.7267

Csw

190

42.29155

-83.71911

Signal

100

42.28744

-83.71449

Csw

193

42.286

-83.71102

Csw

0172-A

42.30489
42.29032

-83.6926
-83.71918

Signal
Signal/Csw

0186-B
0171-B

0171-A
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18028

1722

Savari

18029
18031

1262
207

Savari
Arada

18032

202

Savari

Bonisteel Blvd
Fuller-Glazier
Way East
Fuller-Maiden
Lane
UMTRI
Whl Maint.
Center

42.286

-83.71102

Csw

0172-B

42.28647
42.298

-83.73249
-83.7032

Signal
Other

0126-B
207

42.2264

-83.7178

Other
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5.1.3 SPMD overall structure
Below figure 5.1.3 shows the overall structure of the Safety Pilot
Deployment Data and the data sets collected based on each functionality.
“The SPMD data environment contains sanitized mobility data elements
that were collected from nearly 3000 vehicles, equipped with connected
vehicle technologies, traversing the Ann Arbor, MI transportation
network. Data collected from Roadside Equipment installed at multiple
locations along the transportation networks are included (United State
Department of Transportation, 2012; Basic Safety Message, 2016). The
data in this data environment was collected during two separate months,
October 2012 and April 2013” (Basic Safety Message, 2016).
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Figure 5.1.3: Overall structure of Safety Pilot Deployment Data (Basic Safety
Message, 2016).
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5.1.4 Actual Experiments Data Set
The genuine data sets that were gathered from the original
experiments comprises of millions of individual data collected which are
over 100 GB presented in multiple .csv files which are available on the
USDOT Federal Highway Administration’s Research Data Exchange
website (https://www.its-rde.net/home). The data sets accumulate of Basic
Safety Message, Data Acquisition Systems 1, Data Acquisition Systems 2,
Network, Roadside Equipment, and Weather data (Basic Safety Message,
2016). The primary goal of the field test data to be available to the public
is for demonstration the actual experiment while also allowing the users to
implement queries, an algorithm for better Data Warehousing purposes.

5.1.5 SPMD Samples Data Analysis
For my thesis experiment purposes, I did utilize the SPMD-oneday sample and SPMD- multi-days sample as per suggestion by Walt Fehr
from the USDOT. Each of the BSM data units contains the latitude,
longitude, and elevation of the vehicle and a temporary identifier as the
data unit was transmitted to the road side units (Basic Safety Message,
2016). The Roadside Equipment (RSE) Data Set (BSM) subsets of data
that is mainly being utilized over this experiment is:
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1. Roadside Equipment (RSE) Data Set (BSM)
It contains all of those data units received at the 27 equipped
intersections. The experiments also contains eight .csv files of one-day
sample and thirty-two .csv for multi-day sample which were obtained
from the (https://www.its-rde.net) website.
A small batch of data from both one-day and multi-days’ sample
were utilized to analyze the complete the SPMD data sets assessment
experiment. Python program referenced in Appendix A is written to
collaborate all .csv files and write it into a single database (MongoDB) for
easier sorting and analyzes. Once the database was created, then it was
converted to JSON file format. Another python program referenced in
Appendix B is written to visualize the JSON file format which would
specify and visualize multiple maps including Geolocation points
consisting Latitude, and Longitude is plotted into a single map using
Google Maps.

5.2

Result Analysis
The primary goals for utilizing these data sets over this experiment was
to plot sampled points of the data units transmitted within radio range of the
intersection in the second set into a map. We sampled multiple devices sets
containing both latitude and longitude data sets while utilizing the code
referenced in Appendix B to verify the gap communication. The map is
referenced in Appendix C of this document. The places where data exchange
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between vehicle and transmitter does not occur verifies the interference to the
vehicular communication presented in the SPMD protocol. The causes for the gap
in communication are beyond the scope of this experiment and is subject to future
work.
The short description of the data sets used in my experiments are defined as
follow:
RxDevice is the ID number of the device that logs the Basic Safety Message
(BSM).
BSMID is the ID number that is transmitted from an equipped vehicle.
TemporaryId is the temporary 4-byte random device identifier provided to give
anonymity of vehicle. The life span of these identity remains for 5 minutes only
DSeconds is the time taken between the data transmission between the vehicle
and roadside units.
Latitude is the geographical latitude of the vehicle which is represented as 32 but
value
Longitude is the geographical longitude of the vehicle which is represented as 32
but value
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CHAPTER 6
6.1

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

General Conclusions
The USDOT has currently approved the implementation of a 5.9 GHz
band, along with 802.11p standard for V2V, V2I, V2R and V2X dedicated short
range communications (Shankland, 2014). USDOT currently has a well-defined
and established design to deploy the vehicular technology application but must try
to resolve most of the open concerns such as geo-networking, misbehavior
detection, physical security and safety controller, bootstrapping and security
policies that have been discovered by some of the research studies (Weimerskirch,
n.d.). The National Telecommunications and Information Administrator and
Federal Communications Commission must guarantee that no unlicensed device
be able to interfere with the Vehicle to Roadside Unit operations as unauthorized
access over these mechanisms could potentially cause significant human
destruction.

Two Major Contributions during my thesis research project are listed as below:
1. The detection of gaps in the SPMD data sets provided by the USDOT
2. The methodology used for analyzing the large data set for V2I communication

6.2

Answers to Research Questions
In Chapter 1 the problem statements were presented together with the
research questions. After the detail analysis and thesis research performed below
are the answered based upon the findings to the research questions.
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1.

Can we determine that the SPMD (Safety Pilot Deployment Model) protocol
is susceptible to the interruptions during V2I (vehicle to infrastructure)
communication and thus verify our proposed objectives using the SPMD data
sets?
As discussed in sections 5.1 and 5.2 of this research paper, the maps
representing the SPMD data sets clearly show the gaps in the communication
when occurred between vehicles and roadside units.
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CHAPTER 7
7.1

FUTURE WORK

Significant of the gaps between V2I communication
More data from the actual experiment done at Ann Arbor by UMTRI can
be utilized to analyze the significance of the gaps between the communication in
the Safety Pilot Model Deployment protocol. Advance technology and
methodology might be utilized in future to identify whether the significant of gaps
are caused due any available hotspot in the region or other factors.

7.2

Identify the causes of gaps
Acquiring any of the SPMD protocols products to analyze actual V2I
communication data would take the research to the next level. Further detail
analysis for the significant of the gaps in communication could then lead in the
detection of the intentional and unintentional attack causing the gap in
communication. So, moving forward if a real experiment with cars that have
SPMD protocol for V2I communication can be used to find the main causes of the
gaps between the communication. That way any other exposures presented in the
protocol could be identified and resolved ahead of time.
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import fnmatch
import os
import csv
from collections import OrderedDict
from pymongo import MongoClient
from geopy.geocoders import Nominatim
import googlemaps

def initDatabase():
mongo_url = 'localhost:27017'
databaseClient = MongoClient(mongo_url)
return databaseClient

def setupCollections():
databaseClient = initDatabase()
SPMD = databaseClient['SPMD']
return SPMD

def reverseGeo(latitude, longitude):
latlon = latitude + ',' +longitude
geolocator = Nominatim()
location = geolocator.reverse(latlon)
return location.address

def get_files_list():
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csv_files = []
for file in os.listdir("."):
if fnmatch.fnmatch(file, '*.csv'):
csv_files.append(os.path.abspath(file))
#print(os.path.abspath(file))
return csv_files

def csv_reader(csvfile):
rows_list = []

with open(csvfile, 'r') as csvread:
print("[+] Reading CSV File {}".format(csvfile))
csvreader = csv.reader(csvread, delimiter=',', quotechar='|')
next(csvreader, None) # skip the headers
for row in csvreader:
# Rows from a CSV FIle
required_data = OrderedDict([
('RxDevice', row[0]),
('BSMID',row[1]),
('TemporaryId', row[4]),
('DSeconds', row[5]),
('Latitude', row[6]),
('Longitude', row[7])
])
# Modified Latitude and Longitude
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## For Latitude
latitude = str(required_data['Latitude'])
if '-' in latitude:
latitude = list(latitude)
latitude.insert(3, '.')
else:
latitude = list(latitude)
latitude.insert(2, '.')
required_data['Latitude'] = ''.join(latitude)

## For Longitude
longitude = str(required_data['Longitude'])
if '-' in latitude:
longitude = list(longitude)
longitude.insert(4, '.')
else:
longitude = list(longitude)
longitude.insert(3, '.')
required_data['Longitude'] = ''.join(longitude)
rows_list.append(required_data)
# Return all rows for a CSV File
return rows_list

if __name__ == '__main__':
SPMD = setupCollections()
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SPMD_one_day_collection = SPMD['OneDaySample']
csv_files = get_files_list()

for csvfile in csv_files:
# print("[+] Attempting reading {}".format(csvfile))
rows_list = csv_reader(csvfile)
for line in rows_list:

# Request directions via public transit
if SPMD_one_day_collection.find_one(line) is None:

# Look up an address with reverse geocoding
line['Address'] = reverseGeo(line['Latitude'], line['Longitude'])
post_id = SPMD_one_day_collection.insert_one(line).inserted_id
print(post_id)
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<! DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8">
<title>Geolocation map out with <code>setTimeout()</code></title>
<! -- Defining the css values for button -->
<style>
html, body {
height: 100%;
margin: 0;
padding: 0;
}
#map {
height: 100%;
}
#floating-panel {
position: absolute;
top: 10px;
right: 5%;
z-index: 5;
background-color: #fff;
padding: 5px;
border: 1px solid #999;
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text-align: center;
font-family: 'Roboto','sans-serif';
line-height: 30px;
padding-right: 10px;
}
#floating-panel {
margin-right: -52px;
}
</style>
</head>
<body>
<div id="floating-panel">
<button id="drop" onclick="drop()">Drop Markers</button>
</div>
<div id="map"></div>
<script>
<! -- Pass all Latitude and Longitude value into the latlong array -->
var latlong = [

];

var markers = [];
var map;
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<! -- Center postion of the map when initially loaded -->
function initMap() {
map = new google.maps.Map(document.getElementById('map'), {
zoom: 12,
center: {lat: 42.2976126, lng: -83.728420}
});
}
<! -- Start dropping LatLong values marks into the map with defined time -->
function drop() {
clearMarkers();

for (var i = 0; i < latlong.length; i++) {
addMarkerWithTimeout(latlong[i], i * 200);
}
}
<! -- Time defined to drop each and every value -->
function addMarkerWithTimeout(position, timeout) {
window.setTimeout(function() {
markers.push(new google.maps.Marker({
position: position,
map: map,
animation: google.maps.Animation.DROP
}));
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}, timeout);
}
<! -- Clearing the markers initially when map with center position is only loaded -->
function clearMarkers() {
for (var i = 0; i < markers.length; i++) {
markers[i].setMap(null);
}
markers = [];
}
</script>
<! -- Using Google api with key to map the geolocation -->
<script async defer

src="https://maps.googleapis.com/maps/api/js?key=AIzaSyDIyIDCB_bCzjDoPR
YHoyY3wlUG7LZomoY&callback=initMap">
</script>
</body>
</html>
Note: This code has been directly used from google and modified to utilize a specific
Latitude and Longitude. [29]
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Google Maps with plotted points

Figure C.1: One Day Multi Vehicles (i.e. Overall 25000) -Zoomed out

Figure C.2: One Day Multi Vehicles (i.e. Overall 25000) - Zoomed in from figure
C.1
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Figure C.3: One Day Multi Vehicles (i.e. Overall 25000) - Zoomed in from figure
C.2

Figure C.4: One Day Multi Vehicles (i.e. Overall 25000) - Zoomed in Satellite view
from figure C.3
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One Day - Single Vehicle Sample
Rx Device – 10116

Figure D.1: One Day One Vehicle (Rx Device-10116) - Zoomed out

Figure D.2: One Day One Vehicle (Rx Device-10116) - Zoomed in from figure D.1
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Figure D.3: One Day One Vehicle (Rx Device-10116) - Zoomed in Satellite view from
figure D.2
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RxDevice – 10134

Figure E.1: One Day One Vehicle (Rx Device-10134) - Zoomed out

Figure E.2: One Day One Vehicle (Rx Device-10134) - Zoomed in from figure E.1
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Figure E.3: One Day One Vehicle (Rx Device-10134) - Zoomed in Satellite view from
figure E.2
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RxDevice – 10145

Figure F.1: One Day One Vehicle (Rx Device-10145) - Zoomed out

Figure F.2: One Day One Vehicle (Rx Device-10145) - Zoomed in from figure F.1
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Figure F.3: One Day One Vehicle (Rx Device-10145) - Zoomed in Satellite view from
figure F.2
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Multi Days - Single Vehicle Sample
Rx Device – 10116

Figure G.1: Multi Days One Vehicle (Rx Device-10116) - Zoomed out

Figure G.2: Multi Days One Vehicle (Rx Device-10116) - Zoomed in from figure G.1
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Figure G.3: Multi Days One Vehicle (Rx Device-10116) - Zoomed in Satellite view
from figure G.2
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RxDevice – 10134

Figure H.1: Multi Days One Vehicle (Rx Device-10134) - Zoomed out

Figure H.2: Multi Days One Vehicle (Rx Device-10134) - Zoomed in from figure H.1
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Figure H.3: Multi Days One Vehicle (Rx Device-10134) - Zoomed in Satellite view
from figure H.2
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RxDevice – 10145

Figure I.1: Multi Days One Vehicle (Rx Device-10145) - Zoomed out

Figure I.2: Multi Days One Vehicle (Rx Device-10145) - Zoomed in from figure G.1
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Figure I.3: Multi Days One Vehicle (Rx Device-10145) - Zoomed in Satellite view from
figure I.2
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N
To protect consumers from security
and privacy threats to their motor
vehicles, and for
other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
l l l l l l l l l l
Mr. MARKEY (for himself and Mr.
BLUMENTHAL) introduced the following
bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on
l l l l l l l l l l

A BILL
To protect consumers from security and
privacy threats to
their motor vehicles, and for
other purposes.
1

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

72

2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
4

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Security and Privacy

5 in Your Car Act of 2015’’ or the ‘‘SPY Car Act of 2015’’.
6 SEC. 2. CYBERSECURITY STANDARDS FOR MOTOR
VEHI7
8

CLES.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 301 of title 49, United

9 States Code, is amended—
10

(1) in section 30102(a)—

73

MDM15C25
S
.L.C.
2
1

(A) by redesignating paragraphs

2

through (11) as paragraphs (10) through (17),

3

respectively;

4

(B) by redesignating paragraphs

5

through (3) as paragraphs (4) through (6), re-

6

spectively;

7

(4)

(1)

(C) by inserting before paragraph (3), as

8

redesignated, the following:

9

‘‘(1) ‘Administrator’ means the Administrator

10

of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-

11

tion;

12
13
14

‘‘(2)

‘Commission’ means the Federal Trade

Commission;
‘‘(3) ‘critical software systems’ means software

15

systems that can affect the driver’s control of the ve-

16

hicle movement;’’; and

17
as

(D) by inserting after paragraph

18

redesignated, the following:

19

‘‘(7) ‘driving data’ include, but are not limited

20
21

to, any electronic information collected about—
‘‘(A) a vehicle’s status, including, but not

(6),
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22
23
24

limited to, its location or speed; and
‘‘(B) any owner, lessee, driver, or passenger of a vehicle;
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3
1
2
3
4
5

‘‘(8) ‘entry points’ include, but are not limited
to, means by which—
‘‘(A) driving data may be accessed, directly
or indirectly; or
‘‘(B) control signals may be sent or re-

6

ceived either wirelessly or through wired con-

7

nections;

8

‘‘(9) ‘hacking’ means the unauthorized access to

9
10
11
12
13
14

electronic controls or driving data, either wirelessly
or through wired connections;’’; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
‘‘§ 30129. Cybersecurity standards
‘‘(a) CYBERSECURITY STANDARDS.—
‘‘(1) REQUIREMENT.—All motor vehicles manu-

15

factured for sale in the United States on or after the

16

date that is 2 years after the date on which final

17

regulations are prescribed pursuant to section

18

2(b)(2) of the SPY Car Act of 2015 shall comply

19

with the cybersecurity standards set forth in para-

20

graphs (2) through (4).

21

‘‘(2) PROTECTION AGAINST HACKING.—
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22

‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—All entry points to the

23

electronic systems of each motor vehicle manu-

24

factured for sale in the United States shall be
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1

equipped with reasonable measures to protect

2

against hacking attacks.
‘‘(B) ISOLATION MEASURES.—The

3
meas4

ures referred to in subparagraph (A) shall in-

5

corporate isolation measures to separate critical

6

software systems from noncritical software sys-

7

tems.
‘‘(C) EVALUATION.—The measures re-

8
9

ferred to in subparagraphs (A) and (B) shall be

10

evaluated for security vulnerabilities following

11

best security practices, including appropriate

12

applications of techniques such as penetration

13

testing.
‘‘(D) ADJUSTMENT.—The measures re-

14
15

ferred to in subparagraphs (A) and (B) shall be

16

adjusted and updated based on the results of

17

the evaluation described in subparagraph (C).

18
INFORMA-

‘‘(3) SECURITY OF COLLECTED

19

TION.—All driving data collected by the electronic

20

systems that are built into motor vehicles shall be
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21
22
23
24
25

reasonably secured to prevent unauthorized access—
‘‘(A) while such data are stored onboard
the vehicle;
‘‘(B) while such data are in transit from
the vehicle to another location; and
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‘‘(C) in any subsequent offboard storage or

1
2

use.

3
RESPOND-

‘‘(4) DETECTION, REPORTING, AND

4

ING TO HACKING.—Any motor vehicle that presents

5

an entry point shall be equipped with capabilities to

6

immediately detect, report, and stop attempts to

7

intercept driving data or control the vehicle.

8

‘‘(b) PENALTIES.—A person that violates this section

9 is

liable

Government

to

the

United

States

for

a

civil

pen-

10 alty of not more than $5,000 for each
violation in accord11 ance with section 30165.’’.
12
13

(b) RULEMAKING.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 18 months

14

after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Ad-

15

ministrator, after consultation with the Commission,

16

shall issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to

17

carry out section 30129 of title 49, United States

18

Code, as added by subsection (a).

19

(2) FINAL REGULATIONS.—Not later than

3
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20

years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the

21

Administrator, after consultation with the Commis-

22

sion, shall issue final regulations to carry out section

23

30129 of title 49, United States Code, as added by

24

subsection (a).
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1
after

(3) UPDATES.—Not later than

3 years

2

final regulations are issued pursuant to paragraph

3

(2) and not less frequently than once every 3 years

4

thereafter, the Administrator, after consultation with

5

the Commission, shall—

6

(A) review the regulations issued pursuant

7

to paragraph (2); and

8

(B) update such regulations, as necessary.

9

(c) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections

10

for chapter 301 of title 49, United States Code, is amend-

11

ed by striking the item relating to section 30128 and in-

12

serting the following:
‘‘30128. Vehicle rollover prevention and crash mitigation.
‘‘30129. Cybersecurity standards.’’.

13
Section

(d)

CONFORMING

AMENDMENT.—

14

30165(a)(1) of title 49, United States Code, is amended

15

by inserting ‘‘30129,’’ after ‘‘30127,’’.

16

SEC. 3. CYBER DASHBOARD.

17

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 32302 of title 49, United

18

States Code, is amended by inserting after subsection (b)

19

the following:
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20
21

‘‘(c) CYBER DASHBOARD.—
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—All motor vehicles manu-

22

factured for sale in the United States on or after the

23

date that is 2 years after the date on which final

24

regulations are prescribed pursuant to section
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1

3(b)(2) of the SPY Car Act of 2015 shall display a

2

‘cyber dashboard’, as a component of the label re-

3

quired to be affixed to each motor vehicle under sec-

4

tion 32908(b).

5

‘‘(2) FEATURES.—The cyber dashboard re-

6

quired under paragraph (1) shall inform consumers,

7

through an easy-to-understand, standardized graph-

8

ic, about the extent to which the motor vehicle pro-

9

tects the cybersecurity and privacy of motor vehicle

10

owners, lessees, drivers, and passengers beyond the

11

minimum requirements set forth in section 30129 of

12

this title and in section

13

Commission Act.’’.

14

(b) RULEMAKING.—

15

27 of the Federal Trade

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 18 months

16

after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Ad-

17

ministrator, after consultation with the Commission,

18

shall prescribe regulations for the cybersecurity and

19

privacy information required to be displayed under

20

section 32302(c) of title 49, United States Code, as

21

added by subsection (a).
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22

(2) FINAL REGULATIONS.—Not later than

23

years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the

24

Administrator, after consultation with the Commis-

25

sion, shall issue final regulations to carry out section

3
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1

32302 of title 49, United States Code, as added by

2

subsection (a).

3

(3) UPDATES.—Not less frequently than once

4

every 3 years, the Administrator, after consultation

5

with the Commission, shall—

6

(A) review the regulations issued pursuant

7

to paragraph (2); and

8

(B) update such regulations, as necessary.

9 SEC. 4. PRIVACY STANDARDS FOR MOTOR VEHICLES.
10

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Federal Trade Commission

11

Act (15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.) is amended by inserting after

12

section 26 (15 U.S.C. 57c-2) the following:

13 ‘‘SEC. 27. PRIVACY STANDARDS FOR MOTOR
VEHICLES.
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—All motor vehicles manufactured

14
15

for sale in the United States on or

after

the

date

that

16 is 2 years after the date on which final
regulations

are

17 prescribed pursuant to subsection (e) shall
comply

with
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18 the features required under subsections
(b) through (d).
‘‘(b) TRANSPARENCY.—Each motor vehicle shall pro-

19
20

vide clear and conspicuous notice, in

clear

and

plain

lan-

21 guage, to the owners or lessees of such
vehicle

of

the

col-

22 lection, transmission, retention, and use
of driving data
23
24

collected from such motor vehicle.
‘‘(c) CONSUMER CONTROL.—
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9
1

‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraphs (2)

2

and (3), owners or lessees of motor vehicles shall be

3

given the option of terminating the collection and re-

4

tention of driving data.

5
If a

‘‘(2) ACCESS TO NAVIGATION TOOLS.—

6

motor vehicle owner or lessee decides to terminate

7

the collection and retention of driving data under

8

paragraph (1), the owner or lessee shall not lose ac-

9

cess to navigation tools or other features or capabili-

10
11
not

ties, to the extent technically possible.
‘‘(3) EXCEPTION.—Paragraph

(1) shall

12

apply to driving data stored as part of the electronic

13

data recorder system or other safety systems on-

14

board the motor vehicle that are required for post-

15

incident investigations, emissions history checks,

16

crash avoidance or mitigation, or other regulatory

17

compliance programs.

18
IN-

‘‘(d) LIMITATION ON USE OF PERSONAL DRIVING

19

FORMATION.—
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20

‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—A manufacturer (including

21

an original equipment manufacturer) may not use

22

any information collected by a motor vehicle for ad-

23

vertising or marketing purposes without affirmative

24

express consent by the owner or lessee.
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1
2

‘‘(2) REQUESTS.—Consent requests under paragraph (1)—

3

‘‘(A) shall be clear and conspicuous;

4

‘‘(B) shall be made in clear and plain lan-

5

guage; and
‘‘(C) may not be a condition for the use of

6
7

any nonmarketing feature, capability, or

8

functionality of the motor vehicle.

9

‘‘(e) ENFORCEMENT.—A violation of this section

10

shall be treated as an unfair and deceptive act or practice

11

in violation of a rule prescribed under section

12

18(a)(1)(B).’’.

13
14

(b) RULEMAKING.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 18 months

15

after the date of the enactment of this Act, the

16

Commission, after consultation with the Adminis-

17

trator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-

18

ministration

19

‘‘Administrator’’), shall prescribe regulations, in ac-

20

cordance with section 553 of title 5, United States

21

Code, to carry out section 27 of the Federal Trade

(referred to in this subsection as the
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22

Commission Act, as added by subsection (a).

23

(2) FINAL REGULATIONS.—Not later than

24

years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the

25

Commission, after consultation with the Adminis-

3
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11
1

trator, shall issue final regulations, in accordance

2

with section 553 of title 5, United States Code, to

3

carry out section 27 of the Federal Trade Commis-

4

sion Act, as added by subsection (a).

5

(3) UPDATES.—Not less frequently than once

6

every

7

with the Administrator, shall—

8
9
10

3 years, the Commission, after consultation

(A) review the regulations prescribed pursuant to paragraph (2); and
(B) update such regulations, as necessary.

